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Abstract: The Crimean Tatars’ genocide is one of the clearest, and yet least studied of twentieth-century genocides. 
This article explores that genocide’s aftermath, beginning with the Crimean Tatars’ attempts to reinscribe their 
presence in their historic homeland following the 1944 deportation. The ongoing contestations over the past are 
examined here as a historical habitus informing attitudes and behavior in the present. Drawing on unparalleled 
interview data with the Russian-speaking population in Crimea, I explore the durability and ontological resonance 
of constructions of Tatars as traitors both past and present. Ethnographic insight into the local understandings 
that feed exclusion, discrimination, and hatred enhance our understanding of genocide as a social process. Given 
the lack of either guilt or shame regarding the 1944 deportation, I suggest that Crimea currently lacks the cognitive 
and affective foundation to create a more inclusive future.
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The Crimean Tatars’ genocide is one of the clearest, and yet least studied twentieth-century 
genocides. The definition used here is an inclusive one, best summarized by Alexander Hinton as 
“the more or less coordinated attempt to destroy a dehumanized and excluded group of people 
because of who they are.”1 The death toll as a result of the 1944 deportation was catastrophic: 46 
percent of the population is believed to have perished at that time.2 In addition to this physical 
destruction, efforts were made to cleanse all traces of them from the Crimean landscape, and to 
ensure the assimilation of survivors in places of exile.  Analyzing these and subsequent events 
within the framework of critical genocide studies reveals the treatment of the indigenous Crimean 
Tatars as an ongoing social practice and technology of power on the part of first the Russian and 
then the Soviet regimes.3 
The systematic erasure of the Crimean Tatars was holistic in nature. Crimean Tatar place 
names were changed to Soviet ones; mosques were turned into movie theatres (or worse); homes, 
livestock and gardens were given away; and mention of Crimean Tatars was deleted or abbreviated 
in reference works. Crimean Tatars were not allowed to reside in, or speak of, their homeland. 
It wasn’t even possible to preserve a Crimean Tatar identity in personal documents. In Central 
Asia, before efforts to assimilate the survivors were underway, Crimean Tatars lived in a Special 
Settlement regime in which tens of thousands died of malnutrition, dehydration, and disease. They 
were also demonized. To give but one example, Crimean Tatars describe how children’s heads 
were checked for horns by their Central Asian school teachers.
This article unfolds in several steps. Considering that one component or aftermath of genocide 
is the attempt to erase the group from official history, I explore sites of memory, especially 
public commemoration. Although the ability of Crimean Tatars to commemorate their past as 
part of independent Ukraine at first suggests resilience, their efforts to reinscribe their presence 
on the peninsula and regain their rights have been met with opposition and resistance. Public 
commemorations interest me because they are one way in which competing interpretations 
of history become audible or legible and are then contested. Two insurrections of subjugated 
knowledge as part of independent Ukraine, billboards and a film, demonstrate these contestations. 
That the Crimean population, for the most part, does not recognize the treatment of the Crimean 
Tatars as genocide at all calls for deeper analysis. In the next part of the paper, I explore the 
thoughts and emotions behind the antipathy that continues to be directed at this indigenous 
people. Ethnographic insight into the local understandings that feed exclusion, discrimination, 
and hatred will enhance our understanding of genocide as a social process. My approach extends 
the work of other scholars of genocide by suggesting there is a historical habitus, or ingrained 
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way of interpreting and embodying the past. These interpretations are fortified by what Hinton 
has called the ontological resonance of genocide. In Crimea, this ontological resonance manifests 
in categorical distinctions of Crimean Tatars as dangerous Others. Finally, I show how the post-
annexation treatment of the Crimean Tatars by local and Russian Federation authorities shows an 
effort to restructure relations among the living yet again, in part by circumscribing interpretations 
of the past. Taken together, this exploration leads me ask whether we are witnessing what scholars 
of genocide would call an extended aftermath, or priming for a new round. 
Methods
This article is based on long-term fieldwork conducted in Crimea in 1995, 1997-98, 2001, 2004, 
and 2011, when I lived and worked among the indigenous Crimean Tatar population. During the 
1997-98 fieldwork, I lived in both Central Asia, where the majority of Crimean Tatars remaining in 
diaspora and their descendants reside, and in Crimea. The ethnography published in 2004 did not 
delve deeply into the views of Russians in Crimea. This article begins to fill that gap. I returned in 
2013 and, struck by signs of neo-Stalinism, collected the data presented here. 
The ethnographic fieldwork carried out in May and June 2013 sought to better understand 
how and why Tatarophobia, or xenophobia had become so prevalent on the peninsula. During the 
fieldwork, I gathered several kinds of data, interpolated here. First, unstructured interviews with 
political and cultural leaders, school teachers and principals, newspaper editors, journalists, and 
civil society monitors enabled me to begin tracking the ground level processes through which 
shared interpretations were being formed. Second, taped, semi-structured interviews conducted 
with a stratified sample of sympathizers with the Russian Federation4 (ethnic Russians and mixed 
Russian and Ukrainians) using visual images of Stalin to elicit responses provided another layer 
of information. These data are not intended to be representative: my objective is rather to reveal 
some of the deeper layers informing the abysmal treatment of the Tatars that are obscured in 
other accounts. I used visual prompts because as Plamper has shown, reverence for Stalin was 
“overwhelmingly a visual phenomenon, tailored to a population whose mental universe was 
shaped primarily by images as opposed to written words.”5 The deep psychological and spiritual 
importance of images of the so-called father of peoples is clear considering that Stalin portraits 
were often hung in the corner of the home that had previously been reserved for icons.
In 2013, I also drew on a third source of information: participation in a number of commemorative 
activities related to the Day of Mourning. The interviews and participant observation in Crimea 
upon which the core of my argument is built are supplemented by ongoing communication with 
consultants in the region, as well as close attention to Crimean Tatars’ news reporting available on 
the Internet today. 
Aftermaths: Independent Ukraine
Any country emerging from a totalitarian, genocidal, or war-torn past must confront questions 
about how to frame and incorporate that past while designing a better future. As Nanci Adler has 
argued, “The process of fashioning a good future out of a ‘bad past’ is tricky and may require the 
creation of a ‘usable past’ for the national narrative.”6 The field of reconciliation studies suggests 
there are multiple layers and approaches here, including acknowledgement, apology, truth, justice, 
and reparations.7 And yet, post-Soviet Russia only made limited efforts to confront its Stalinist past, 
seeming to prefer to suppress memories of repression.8 As a result, surviving victims of Stalinism 
have been insufficiently acknowledged. Adler sees the prevalence of the state-sponsored narrative 
over the victims’ counter-histories as part of a larger failure to create adequate transitional justice 
mechanisms and move toward full-fledged civil society. From her perspective, Russia has not yet 
created a space for what she calls “engaging dialogues,” that could lead to inclusive history.9 
Within a framework of critical genocide studies, we can go farther. Not only has their been 
insufficient acknowledgement, but the Crimean Tatar genocide is treated first by Soviet and now 
Russian Federation authorities as something the Crimean Tatars brought upon themselves. Locals 
allege the Crimean Tatars’ punishment was justified, even though there is no morally or ethically 
sound justification for the treatment they received. In part, this is a result of diametrically opposed 
interpretations of history. Russians and those of mixed Russian and Ukrainian heritage who are 
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pro-Russia tend to deploy an idiom that legitimatizes their presence by referencing the fact that 
Crimea was a part of Russia from 1783 until 1954, and reiterate the charges of treason during the 
Nazi occupation of Crimea. The Crimean Tatars counter this by pointing to what the charges elide, 
which is that members of all ethnic groups contributed to the Nazi occupation, and that these are 
not the people who were punished by the 1944 deportation, which carried away innocents. That 
Crimean Tatars soldiers fought (and gave their lives) on the Soviet front and were demobilized 
into exile is of course a moral outrage. They also emphasize their autochthonous origins on the 
peninsula, long before Ekaterina II annexed the peninsula. Thus it is important to recognize the 
extent to which different ethnic groups—and here I will focus on the pro-Russian contingent 
and Crimean Tatars—have competing idioms for relating to, and when necessary justifying their 
presence on, the peninsula they share.10 While their idioms overlap on concern with the meaning 
of homeland, patriotism, and treason, they have very different reference points.
It is worthwhile to contrast the situation in the Russian Federation with post-genocidal settings 
where transitional justice mechanisms, however imperfect or limited, have been established. For 
example, Molly Andrews has argued the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
created a national narrative and ultimately a common framework for the whole country to 
understand the past.11 She suggests that (again, in spite of many shortcomings) the South-African 
commission managed to forge a dialogue between official and personal narratives, and to formulate 
an inclusive history. A rich line of research into the reconciliation process explores the nuances of 
this process in a variety of countries.12
As a part of Ukraine, Crimea occupied a volatile and yet fertile position between these two 
variants. An insurrection of previously subjugated knowledges led, while the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea was part of Ukraine, to writing the 1944 deportation back into history books, putting 
the minarets back on the mosques, and erecting multiple public monuments to commemorate 
Crimean Tatar military heroes and cultural leaders. While the process was far from complete, and 
characterized by failures and frustrations, it is important to recognize the extent to which Crimean 
Tatars were able to reinstate their rightful presence on the peninsula, and reinscribe their history 
on the landscape they hold sacred. 
Even as they became legible on the Crimean peninsula, however, it became a landscape of 
hatred and distrust as monuments and memorials were marked with swastikas or other xenophobic 
graffiti, and groups clashed over such matters as placing a market on a Crimean Tatar sacred site. 
As part of Ukraine, hostility against Crimean Tatars included attacks and pogroms against Crimean 
Tatar settlements and property in 2004. An attack on a Crimean Tatar settlement backed by special 
Ukrainian Berkut riot police in January and November, 2007; the attack and beating of Crimean 
Tatars on the Ay-Petri plateau in November 2007; and vandalism of Crimean Tatar cemeteries 
and memorials in Zaprudne, Zuya. Saq, Bagcasaray, Nyznohirskyi and many other locales. The 
Foundation for Research and Support of Indigenous Peoples that tracks these activities concluded 
vandalism is more the rule than the exception.13
How to understand these contestations? Within the framework of critical genocide studies, a 
Foucauldian genealogy with its concepts of counter-memory and counter-history helps to decipher 
the struggle over commemoration and competing visions of the past.14 This approach is relevant 
because as part of Ukraine, cross currents of power and resistance appeared to be reshaping the 
field of commemoration and expanding the space for remembering different, sometimes painful 
aspects of the past. By way of background, counter-histories try to undo the silences imposed 
by official histories, and to undermine the unity and continuity that dominant histories produce. 
The ability to identify omissions and to fill discursive gaps previously imposed by authorities is 
an important component of exercising agency and resisting both hegemonic power/knowledge 
frameworks and, at a more concrete level, sociopolitical subjugation. 
My 2004 ethnography detailed how activists in the Crimean Tatar national movement such as 
Mustafa Cemilev, Reshat Cemilev, Aishe Seitmuratov, Rustem Khalilov, Izzet Khairov and many 
others, clearly articulated a counter-narrative explicating how the 1944 deportation violated the laws 
and principles of the Soviet regime, and subjected the Crimean Tatar people to decimation. They also 
make clear that by the time of the deportation, the Crimean Tatar people had survived not just the 
initial colonization, but confiscation of their property, state-induced famine, purges of clergy and 
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intellectuals, and Nazi occupation.15 In a personal interview, this was aptly summarized by Mustafa 
Cemilev as being caught between to hegemons, neither of whom promised any protection or relief.16 
What I am concerned with presently is less the historical scholarship and activism facilitating 
the Crimean Tatars mass return in the 1990s, than the public spaces where ordinary Crimean Tatars, 
Ukrainians and Russians are now interlocutors. These sites demonstrate that there is no single 
aftermath of genocide: it becomes a plural noun. Pro-Russian and pro-Crimean Tatar versions of 
the past are diametrically opposed. The differing perspectives on the past led, unquestionably, to 
different perspectives on the future. We now see each group has very different access to rights and 
resources on the peninsula as a legacy of the deportation. 
The Contested Past
In spite of attempts to erase and assimilate them, the Crimean Tatars survived their exile, launched 
a powerful national movement, and mobilized sufficient personal and political resources to 
repatriate.17 Since they began returning, Crimean Tatars have struggled to reverse the effects of the 
literal and discursive cleansing.18 Examples show the slow movement of a previously marginalized 
Crimean Tatar past into the Crimean imagined community. 
One example is the commemoration of the 1944 deportation, referred to in Crimea as a “день 
память и скорби” or day of memory and mourning. In a move that would certainly have been 
quashed 20 years ago, some twelve billboards calling participants to observe the occasion were 
positioned across Crimea. One billboard calling for observance of the day showed an image of 
several intersecting lines of barbed wire and a message about the 69th commemoration, bringing 
knowledge that was previously disqualified and excluded into the public space. Another billboard 
brings home the point even more clearly. 
Figure 1. Billboard of Iminov painting calling for commemoration. Source: Author’s photograph.
Rustem Iminov’s painting of a crowded train car, once concealed in his private studio on a 
quiet street in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, was suddenly enlarged many times and thrust into the visual 
field of all drivers in Crimea, whether Russian, Ukrainian, or Crimean Tatar. The billboard makes 
visible how women, children, and the elderly were carried away in cattle cars, not to mention the 
soldiers’ unfortunate demobilization. Thanks to the artist’s willingness for others to use this image, 
it has become iconic of the Crimean Tatars’ deportation. I turn to the billboards because they are 
one way that the Crimean Tatars can speak to other residents of Crimea with whom they might not 
otherwise exchange views.19 
I first met Iminov and saw the painting in 1998, when he was living in Central Asia. I learned 
that whereas Iminov’s father, also a painter, was forced to communicate his ideas cryptically in 
symbolic codes, Iminov succeeded in putting his mother’s individual memories of deportation in 
public, pictorial form.20 The trajectory of this painting from a private Tashkent studio to a Simferopol 
billboard indexes the Crimean Tatars’ own journey from silenced and exiled, to repatriated citizens 
of independent Ukraine. The billboards constitute an intervention into the hegemonic conception 
of the past that failed to register the Crimean Tatars during their absence. 
A second example of the insurrection of previously subjugated knowledge, and one that 
generated a great deal more epistemic friction21 is provided by the 2013 release of a feature film 
about the 1944 deportation, Haytarma. 
Genocide’s Aftermath in Crimea
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The film is structured around the life of the half Crimean Tatar fighter pilot, Amet-Han Sultan. 
The film follows the protagonist through his service when he was stationed in Crimea. The major 
turn in the plot comes when Amet-Han Sultan is given leave to see his family on the eve of the 
deportation. He and two friends find themselves in Amet-Han’s native village on the night of the 
mass deportation. We then experience a filmic representation of that terrible night. 
The film has been criticized on the grounds that it uses the language and iconography of the 
colonizers to communicate its message.22 Admittedly, we see a colonized people taking on, and 
quite literally acting in, the uniform of the oppressor. While this reading of the film is valid on 
formal grounds, a more nuanced reading is possible if we listen to the conversations about the film 
among Crimean Tatars. Recalling that Crimean Tatars were banned from speaking of Crimea in 
exile, and that no images of the actual deportation are known to exist, the film elevated previously 
silenced and submerged memories of war and deportation. While perhaps not a counter-history in 
the sense of a full-fledged denunciation of the Soviet regime, the film does critique the Soviet’s 1944 
deportation. By portraying Amet-Han’s bravery and patriotism fighting on the Soviet side, the film 
also attempts to deconstruct the racist categorization of Crimean Tatars as solely collaborators with 
the German occupiers, and shows ethnically-integrated villages. Like the billboards, the film fills 
a visual lacuna.
For younger Crimean Tatars, parents’ and grandparents’ stories were finally in a visual format. 
Crimean Tatars who acted in the film describe participation as an intense, even cathartic experience. 
At the premier I attended, the film was followed by stunned silence and muffled sobbing. The film 
also received many standing ovations by audiences in Crimea and Kyiv. It is fair to say the film 
punctured the silenced history of deportation and brought Crimean Tatar patriotism into public 
view. If respondents in my fieldwork were correct in their assessment, a page that had been left 
blank, and that had long complicated the mourning process, was now filled, helping to resolve 
some emotions about the event. 
The film’s release generated a great deal of epistemic friction concerning how to most 
accurately portray the Crimean past. The controversy began when the Consul General for the 
Russian Federation in Crimea, Vladimir Andreev, admonished the Russian generals trained by 
Amet-Han Sultan not to attend the Premier. Six of the eight surviving generals took his advice.23 
Figure 2. Promotional flyer for the film Haytarma. Source: The image is taken from the jacket of the CD, and was the 
flyer for the showing of the film as well.   
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Mr. Andreev clarified his position publically on Crimean television. Resurrecting a trope from 
the Second World War (referred to as Great Patriotic War in Crimea), Andreev stated that Russia 
should not be represented at the premier of a film that falsifies the truth of this war.  His primary 
argument was that the film did not grapple with the ostensibly salient theme of collaboration on 
the part of Crimean Tatars with the fascist occupiers. Public discourses like these are a primary way 
that ideologies and cultural stances are not just created, but maintained. Andreev’s remark seems 
designed to create cultural continuity at a moment when it was threatened by change in post-
Soviet Ukraine. By resurrecting the old categorizations of Crimean Tatars as somehow disloyal to 
the homeland, Andreev re-polarized the field of commemoration in a move seemingly intended to 
inscribe the Soviet-era social hierarchy.
Based on the reaction in the family I was living with at the time, Andreev’s comments left the 
Crimean Tatars feeling angry and emotionally bruised. One of my hosts stood and paced, another 
turned red in the face, and all three raised their voices to talk back to the TV. Andreev’s remarks 
also set off a series of demonstrations that were publicized on the nightly news. Holding Andreev’s 
portrait flanked by pictures of Beria and Stalin, Crimean Tatars countered the slur by pointing out 
the symbolic isomorphism between the present Consul General and past Soviet leaders. There 
were also a series of verbal duels that ricocheted through social media like Facebook. 
While the Crimean Tatar contribution in the Second World War remains hotly contested in 
Crimea, Andreev’s intolerance was not accepted, even by authorities. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry 
immediately requested Russian Federation authorities to evaluate the statements. In an address 
before the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, then Vice President of the 
Crimean Tatar Mejlis Refat Chubarov demanded the Russian Federation deplore the intolerant 
statement. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation did indeed acknowledge the 
statement was inappropriate, and Andreev resigned. As we can see from the conflict over Andreev’s 
remarks, references to collaboration with the Nazi forces are particularly toxic in Crimea where, 
even though all the ethnic groups collaborated, Crimean Tatars have been consistently singled out 
as responsible. Ukraine rose, however feebly, in the Crimean Tatar defense.
While a great deal of the contemporary friction is generated by the issue of Second World 
War collaboration, the roots of mistrust lie deeper in the colonial past. The Russian Empire saw 
Crimean Tatars as uncivilized, inferior to Russians, and potentially disloyal. This references events 
during the Crimean War. Raids on Muscovy in the Middle Ages are also often cited today.24 In light 
of these analyses, Tatarophobia has less to do with the Second World War than the Crimean Tatars’ 
long term positioning on the peninsula. Views of the peninsula’s past have remained in separate, 
diametrically opposed, silos. While ethnic Russians see themselves as the original inhabitants of 
Crimea, and argue the Crimean khanate had a weak economy and was only a vassal of the Ottoman 
Empire, Crimean Tatars assert that the Crimean khanate was a highly civilized state in which 
all faiths were accepted, ethnic groups flourished, and the economy thrived. Both are of course 
simplified interpretations. What is more destructive is the view (whether embraced by ethnically 
Russian or ethnically mixed individuals) that Russian culture is superior, supranational, and 
provides a consolidating function. There is also an essentialism that Crimean Tatars are inherently 
hostile and cruel, another justification for their removal from Crimea. From a broader perspective, 
then, the Crimean Tatars were prefigured for predatel’stvo or treason. 
Neostalinism
To reestablish the Crimean Tatar presence on the peninsula would require restructuring the worlds 
of meaning in which Crimean Tatars are cast as traitors or villains. Efforts during the Ukrainian 
period marking the anniversary of the 1944 deportation, erecting monuments to the Crimean 
Tatar past, and writing the 1944 deportation back into history, re-politicized space and time.25 As 
if obeying Newton’s Third Law, for every Crimean Tatar action there was an equal and opposite 
reaction. A paradigmatic example is the counter-movement revalorizing Stalin in Crimea. In 2012, 
an organization named Essence of Time held an exhibition commemorating the 133rd anniversary of 
Stalin’s birth. They combined about 150 images with laudatory comments about Stalin. These were 
presented on large placards in the center of the capitol city where descendants of the victims of 
genocide would be sure to look on. The Crimean Tatar executive body, the Mejlis, spoke out during 
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the planning stage, pointing out such an exhibit would be profoundly disrespectful to victims of 
Stalin. The exhibit took place nonetheless.
Figure 3. Stalin lauded in capitol of Crimea, 2013. Source:  Информационное агентство «е-Крым» http://www.e-
crimea.info
On the opening day, the Head of the International Relations department of the Mejlis went 
to the exhibit with the head of the Secretariat of the Crimean Parliament.26 They called on the 
organizers to take down the images, pointing out that Stalin was found guilty of the death of 
millions of people, and had personally ordered the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, a criminal 
act. When the organizers refused to remove the exhibit, the offended visitors dismantled the stands 
themselves. 
Several dozen law enforcement officers present at the rally did not intervene. The authorities’ 
non-response, effectively allowing residents of Crimea to battle for commemorative space 
themselves, reveals official ambivalence, or perhaps uncertainty about how to effectively moderate 
competing claims. As one respondent put it, “the Mayor who allowed it knew it was against the 
law, but in the depths of their souls, they don’t want to see us here, they hate us. They know they 
have taken other peoples’ places.”27 The exhibit took place in a time and place when Stalin enjoyed 
fabulous public ratings. Levada Center polls showed that among other things, people credited 
victory in the Second World War to Stalin himself, and felt that the importance of the victory far 
outweighed any mistakes that were made.28 Another survey suggested that respondents saw Stalin 
as one of the “most eminent figures of all time.”29
How could Stalin enjoy such a long political life? Considering there was not one but two 
intensive efforts de-Stalinize the Soviet Union and facilitate political liberalization, this at first 
seems remarkable. The first attempt was after the 20th Party speech by Nikita Krushchev, which 
broke a silence about Stalin’s repressive regime and called for the removal of Stalin from public 
spaces. The second effort was part of President Gorbachev’s reforms. Gorbachev recognized the 
need for the Soviet government to give consistent financial and moral support to people who could 
speak openly. Gorbachev’s de-Stalinization in the 1980s faced many of the same problems that 
Krushchev’s had in the 1960s.30 Polly Jones suggests the enduring criticisms are that de-Stalinization 
is a form of “de-heroization,” “falsification,” and “ideological deviation.”31 The psychology that 
keeps Stalin alive aligns with the work of Freud, Derrida, and Gilroy on melancholia, helping us to 
understand neostalinism as an inability to distinguish between past and present.32 Freud’s famous 
delineation of melancholia from mourning is useful here.
Why wasn’t the Soviet government more successful in de-Stalinizing the country? Jones 
suggests that what is blocking genuine de-Stalinization is what she calls the “mutual interference” 
of memories of terror and memories of war victory.33 This is to say that there is a central, seemingly 
irresolvable tension at the core of public memory: how to celebrate the Soviet victory and confront 
its failures, so as to recognize the victims too? In Russia, organizations like Memorial have tried to 
grapple with this issue, and their work has resonated with tens of thousands of people. This is an 
especially fraught issue in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, where the problem is ethnically-
charged. 
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Ontological Resonance 
The outward struggle over this field of commemoration is energized by what Pierre Bourdieu 
would call a habitus or durable disposition. Habitus is Bourdieu’s notion of a “system of lasting, 
transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a 
matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions.”34 Habitus is eminently historical: “The habitus, a 
product of history, produces individual and collective practices—more history—in accordance with 
the schemes generated by history.”35 We can understand this as something that is simultaneously 
micro and macro-sociological: a neo- or pro-Stalinist disposition is acquired through a gradual 
process of inculcation at the same time that it reflects the social conditions in which it was acquired. 
A habitus is never independent of its field, what Bourdieu saw as a set of objective, historical 
relations, anchored by power.36 Along similar lines, in Why Did They Kill, Hinton argues that 
genocide is complex and involves a certain “ontological resonance” of local cultural knowledge 
that, through a variety of factors, rises to the level of having motivational force. Like Hinton, I am 
interested in the role of the patterns of being-in-the-world that are constituted over time as people 
engage in social practices that ultimately come to inform acts of political violence, whether the 
Khmer, Russian, or Soviet.37
To better understand the disposition informing the exhibit to rehabilitate Stalin in Crimea, 
and to glean insight into ongoing antipathy towards Crimean Tatars, I interviewed a stratified 
sample of respondents from the roster of the Russian Society.38 I used images of Stalin collected in 
Corbescero’s research in Russia as prompts to elicit informants’ feelings about the leader.39 The first 
image was a famous portrait of Stalin in uniform.
Figure 4. Portrait of Stalin by Aleksandr Laktionov. Source: Corbescero (2011).
 The second was the same portrait remade as a vodka label, a third depicted the same Stalin 
image writ large on a bus to celebrate the 9th of May,40 and the last image showed demonstrators each 
carrying an individual Stalin portrait in a demonstration. The images elicited reactions both verbal 
and visceral: respondents laughed and cried when they viewed the images. Their reactions suggest 
deep emotional connections to the past and a durable disposition integrating past experiences and 
present perceptions. 
Neither guilt nor shame
Veneration for Stalin reverberated throughout the interviews with Russians and individuals 
with mixed Russian and Ukrainian heritage but embracing a pro-Russian perspective, in Crimea. 
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Presented with images of the leader, respondents used expressions like “gratitude that we are 
alive,” “pride for the activities he carried out,” “empathy,” “neutral,” “accepting,” and “this is the 
image of a good person,” to describe their feelings. Sometimes, the thinking had twisted logic: “If 
he was such a tyrant, they would have shot him!” This respondent clearly had not thought through 
how tyranny works, or the way in which it is the very tyranny of the tyrant that protects him. 
One strategy that seemed to help respondents maintain a positive image of the leader was to 
minimize his crimes: 
How do you feel when you look at this portrait?
Respondent: How to put it into words? Empathy. Empathy that he may have overplayed his 
leadership somewhat. True, he was on the cruel side.41 
In a dizzying moral inversion, this respondent chose to empathize with the leader, rather than his 
victims. In making the comment, this respondent used the word жестоковата, using a qualifier 
to say Stalin was “on the cruel side,” shrinking massive crimes against humanity into a minor 
attribute. It is only in the context of this frame of mind that the crude and ultimately inaccurate 
binary between Russian patriotism and Tatar collaboration can be maintained. Officially sanctioned 
amnesia of Crimean Tatar patriotism, and willed forgetting of the true level of Stalin’s crimes 
perpetuate this outlook. 
Minimization went hand in hand with justification. Part of the justification appeared based 
on survival. Respondents hypothesized that what Stalin did was necessary for victory, and linked 
their personal survival to his tactics: 
How do you feel when you look at this portrait?
Respondent: Gratitude that we are alive [starting to cry] During the war, we had nothing, 
nothing [explanation of things eaten to survive]. Then, after the war, my mother and I had 
tea with sugar in it and I will remember that tea for the rest of my life, it made such an 
impression after going for so long with so little.42 
The survival of extreme deprivation understandably elicits gratitude. But if we juxtapose 
the sweetness of the tea with the death toll from Stalin’s regime, the “cost” of that tea, and the 
respondent’s apparently complete emotional disconnection from the magnitude of the crimes 
committed in the name of her homeland, becomes evident. Due to the secrecy surrounding the 
camps, the length of time that has elapsed, and the variety of means to eliminate people, an exact 
death toll is difficult to calculate. However, representatives of the Soviet security services gave 
the figure of 18 million.43 These facts are lost to residents of Crimea when focused on reliving and 
recognizing victory. The neostalinist views expressed by non-Crimean Tatar informants suggest a 
durable disposition or habitus cultivated for decades. 
Justifications for deporting innocent women, children, elderly, and war-wounded residents of 
Crimea were also based on the idea that the Crimean Tatars somehow deserved and, in thinking 
that stretches credulity, even benefitted from the deportation. Russian justifications tend to be 
dissociated from the reality of genocide. As one example:
If Stalin decided it, then that means it was necessary. And the thing is, they [Crimean Tatars] 
slaughtered whole villages under the fascists. He [Stalin] cast them out, but he sent them 
to a warmer climate! It was a radical measure that was correct at the time. See how spiteful 
[Crimean Tatars] are to complain? They left a place where life was good.44 
The place they left is of course Central Asia in the 1980s and 1990s. The sentiments expressed 
here are widespread in Crimea, where the non-Crimean Tatar population often alleges that it 
was “humanitarian” to deport the Tatars to a warm climate rather than exterminating them. The 
acceptance of Stalin’s act emerging in these interviews reveals the affective and cognitive substrate, 
the habitus informing events like the commemoration of Stalin in the center of Simferopol in 2012, 
and subsequent events. 
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Writing about Crimea, Rory Finnin explores the potential of poetry to shift one’s perspective 
from focusing on the victor to a more empathic position in relation to victims. He explores how 
two poems, one by Chichibabin and one by Nekipelov, create receptivity to perceive the mass 
deportation of innocents (collaborators are believed to have been evacuated with the retreating 
German army) as one of Stalin’s greatest crimes. Thinking of more tolerant and empathic segments 
of the population than I spoke with, Finnin suggests that a deep reading of the poems can engage 
a reader in “an act of guilt-processing conducive to committed activism.”45 Finnin thinks literary 
works can prompt recognition of the complicity of Soviet citizens in the deportation. The twist is 
that the process is more likely to succeed when hearing from some subject positions rather than 
others: if the literary work comes from the victimized community, it is liable to evoke shame, 
which is apt to prompt to avoidance. Guilt, on the other hand, tends to mobilize efforts to repair 
and make amends.  
It is unlikely that the affective and cognitive recognition of Stalin’s act as a crime will occur 
in a Crimean society overshadowed by accusations of treason. In the 2013 fieldwork, Crimean 
Tatars frequently lamented the absence of anything resembling guilt. On the contrary, informants’ 
statements seemed to re-sacralize46 Stalin’s authority, perhaps as a way to maintain a dominant 
position in Crimean society and to reanimate the sense of victory and empowerment that came with 
his rule. Articulating her response to the picture of Stalin in uniform, a Russian informant stated:
He was, is, and will always be forever a great leader. It’s like he is sacred and you can’t just 
erase that from your heart. Millions of people died with his name on their lips. How can you 
throw that away? It’s too late to change anything now [weeping]. I am sorry about the tears 
but this is the life I lived.47
The reverence for Stalin surfacing in certain segments of the population suggested ongoing 
enchantment with the leader. I asked this respondent if she thought Russian or Ukrainian residents 
of Crimea who were not deported or were brought in after the war to take Crimean Tatars’ places 
felt a sense of guilt.
Me personally? No! Why would I feel guilty? I understand many Russians and Ukrainians 
live in Tatars homes. I myself live in a Tatar’s home! But it was vacant at the time we came.48 
What this informant had disassociated from is why the home was vacant when she and her mother 
arrived. As actors on a field of public remembering, these respondents used victory to rationalize 
the price paid by the Crimean Tatar people. 
It is not coincidental that the statements made here were uttered in the Simferopol headquarters 
of the Russian Society. Respondents spoke under posters of Sergei Aksyonov who was then head 
of the Russia Unity party, and was elected Prime Minister in March 2014. In other words, these 
are the sentiments of some of his constituency. What I did not know in 2013 was how accurately 
they foreshadowed the poor treatment of Crimean Tatars accompanying the annexation. An 
anthropological approach is valuable here because it reveals the ontological resonance of Crimean 
Tatars as Other, both past and present. The constructions of Crimean Tatars as traitors demonstrate 
the ontological resonance of categories established in the Russian colonial period. It also 
foreshadows the treatment of the Crimean Tatars following annexation. The time period following 
2014 annexation was marked by a range of human rights abuses: Crimean Tatars were banned from 
assembling, and threatened, imprisoned, and exiled when they dared to express dissent. Crimean 
Tatars were harassed with searches and seizures in their homes, schools and mosques. Even worse, 
there have been arrests, arbitrary detentions, and disappearances.49   
Reflecting on this pocket of disavowal and amnesia, I asked Mustafa Cemilev what explains 
the lack of empathy for Crimean Tatars. His insights suggest links between the official history and 
popular sentiment, and between denial and fear. 
Tatarphobia is understandable given the kind of propaganda that people were stuffed with 
since the Crimean Tatars were deported. Plus, this propaganda gave them some spiritual 
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peace considering they were living in our homes. There is also a fear that maybe what 
happened to the Tatars will happen to them.50
The characterization of Crimean Tatars as ‘traitors who sold the motherland’ has proven impervious 
to change. It provides an expedient phrase that encapsulates the ontological resonance prefiguring 
Crimean Tatars as different, as guilty, and as deserving of punishment. 
The challenges associated with acknowledging the genocide are not unique to Crimea: we see 
very similar issues arising in other settings. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer provide 
important thinking on this topic by suggesting it was a complex defense mechanism against 
memory that prevented Germans after the Second World War from experiencing feelings of guilt.51 
These scholars saw the disavowal of any complicity, as well as admiration for Adolf Hitler, as the 
core of a constellation of psychological symptoms including antisemitism. Psychoanalysts have 
developed this line of thinking to explore how guilt and shame, as well as defenses against them, 
are passed inter-generationally.52 Katharina Rothe suggests that antisemitism should be considered 
a defense against empathizing with the victims in the Second World War.53
This idea presents rich possibilities for understanding dynamics in Crimea, where local 
residents’ distrust of Tatars often seems based more on fiction than reality,54 and where, as Refat 
Chubarov noted in front of the Crimean Parliament at the time of Consul General Andreev’s acerbic 
remarks, xenophobic statements have become almost fashionable in public discourse.55 I suspect 
a similar defense may be animating ongoing anti-Tatarism in Crimea. For some residents, it may 
be less painful and, as Cemilev pointed out, more expedient, to valorize Stalin and disavow any 
benefit from his crimes. It is far more difficult, for us all, to see events from another’s perspective. 
The demonization of Crimean Tatars enables those who make allegations of depravity or treason 
to elevate Stalin, fear Tatars, and avoid both guilt and shame. While some would argue against a 
sociocultural use of psychoanalytic concepts, I would contend, with LaCapra, that psychoanalysis 
is misunderstood as a psychology of the individual. He argues that its basic ideas actually connect 
individual and society. A strict opposition is artificial—what happens to the individual is bound 
up with larger social, political, and cultural processes.56  
Genocide as social practice
There are a number of markers we can use to predict the future of the past in Crimea. I have already 
described how the Crimean Tatars were able to publically commemorate the 1944 deportation 
when Crimea was a part of Ukraine. If symbolic forms such as these help create and maintain 
social hierarchies, the billboards announcing the commemorative event in 2013 were particularly 
significant: the Crimean Tatars leveled, if only temporarily and incrementally, the commemorative 
field when they publicized their past alongside the Russian one. Russian annexation brought a 
very different reality to Crimea. 
On one hand, Putin assured Crimean Tatar representatives who went to Moscow in May 
2014 that Russia will take measures to protect Crimean Tatars and make them feel they are “full 
fledged masters in their own land.”57 At the same time, Crimean Prime Minister Sergei Aksyonov 
issued a decree that banned all mass gatherings in the region, effectively outlawing the 2014 
commemoration of the deportation. Aksyonov used a kaleidoscope of shifting reasons, mostly 
centered on national security, for his decision.58 The central square where Crimean Tatars would 
have gathered was fenced off, guarded by ranks of Russian riot police as well as pro-Russia so 
called self-defense units, and lined with armored personnel carriers. Avoiding conflict, Crimean 
Tatars gathered in a field near their mosque in the Ak Mechet district, just outside the capitol 
city of Simferopol. There, a foreshortened commemoration was carried out under the whirl of 
helicopter blades. 
This attempt to reorganize relations among the living by banning commemoration of the dead 
was a way to begin the process of reordering community in post-annexation Crimea. Scholars of 
genocide are increasingly recognizing how technologies of power such as these make genocide not 
a discrete event with a beginning, middle, and end, but a social process.59 Clearly the change in 
power, and the status of the peninsula as part of the Russian Federation, is reconfiguring more than 
geopolitics. Leaders like Sergei Aksyonov, the Prime Minister and Head of the Supreme Council, 
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and Natalia Poklonskaya, the chief prosecutor confirmed by President Putin, are now engaging 
and intervening in the social process in which the living in Crimea must struggle with the war’s 
legacy: how, when and who to honor?60 How, when, and who to mourn? 
The current authorities’ aims within this emotional substrate are clear in light of the ample 
space afforded to those wishing to commemorate Victory Day: shortly after the Crimean Tatars 
were banned from mourning their loss, Putin flew to Crimea to publicly commemorate Soviet 
victory over Nazi Germany in Sevastopol. Tens of thousands were allowed to flow into the 
streets, and there was a parade with over 60 military vehicles and 70 aircraft.61 The contraction of 
commemorative space accorded to Crimean Tatars relative to Russians (and Russian-Ukrainians) 
throws into bold relief the very real imbalances of power on the peninsula that are papered over by 
official pronouncements of equality before the law. 
The Crimean Tatar response to being banned from carrying out their usual commemoration 
brings us back to the link between genocide and historical memory. Genocide can be understood as 
an act that is directly aimed at destroying ethno-national-religious diversity and altering the social 
fabric of societies so as to remove unwanted traces of undesired peoples.62 This requires removing 
people from any sites that would physically register social memory. Refat Chubarov described 
the decree banning commemoration as an inhumane act, pointing out that the Crimean Tatars had 
essentially been forbidden to mourn their ancestors. A popular TV talk show host, Lilia Budjorova, 
asked rhetorically whether the authorities fully understood the meaning that the day of sorrow and 
remembrance has for the Crimean Tatar people. She warned that the ban would be remembered 
for many years, and can’t be compensated for by any amount of government spending on Crimean 
Tatars.63 Budjurova’s comments suggest that if Aksyonov wants Crimean Tatar support to secure 
his rule, the ban may actually be counterproductive to his aims:
Today, like tens of thousands of my compatriots, I have been banned from coming into the 
center of my own town to stand next to those who have lost mothers, fathers, and children. I 
have been banned from sharing their pain. You have taken away my right to make sure that 
my grandchildren know that this tragedy must never repeat itself.64
Budjurova suggested that pain can only be reduced with empathy and understanding. With 
this, she suggests more empathy would have set a very different tone to relations between 
the new authorities and the indigenous Tatars. This also jives with what we know about 
transitional justice. In the repertoire of effective mechanisms, the commemoration of victims 
is widely considered a crucial part of reconciliation with a repressive past.65 In 2014, the new 
Crimean administration headed by Aksyonov missed an opportunity to be more accepting of all 
members of the society and move to a less polarized future. If the 2014 commemorations are any 
indication, Crimeans will again be confined to a single narrative that elides the Crimean Tatar 
experience. 
In spite of assurances on the part of President Vladimir Putin and Aksyonov, what has 
transpired since annexation hardly amounts to protection of the endangered group. For one 
thing, there has been a rash of disappearances. In one case, a witness reported seeing two men 
forced into a mini-van by men in black uniforms before they disappeared. Accounts vary but 
according to Human Rights Watch there have been at least seven and potentially as many as 18 
disappearances.66 Officials only acknowledge four. Searches of Crimean Tatar homes became 
almost routine in during summer 2014. These were carried out in the name of “protecting” the 
people. There has also been harassment of mass media outlets: self-defense battalions comprised 
of men in camouflage gear and balaclavas have searched and seized broadcasting equipment at 
some of Crimea’s major television channels. The systematic attempt to weaken the community 
has included banning Crimean Tatar leaders from residing in Crimea among their people. First 
came renowned defender of human rights, Ukrainian parliamentarian, and former Head of 
the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, Mustafa Cemilev. Then came the elected President or Chairman of 
the Mejlis, Refat Chubarov. In February 2015, acting Chairman of the Mejlis, Akhtem Chivgoz 
was arrested and imprisoned. These practices amount to the gradual weakening of this people 
through discrimination, harassment, and isolation, over time. 
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Conclusion
As a result of this analysis, I hope to have contributed a deeper understanding of the Crimean 
Tatar genocide. I have argued that while Crimea was part of Ukraine, it experienced a volatile and 
yet fertile insurrection of previously subjugated knowledges. Public commemorations became a 
lightening rod, channeling contestations over the recent and distant past. While previous gaps and 
omissions were made visible, hegemonic power/knowledge frameworks continued to make one 
group appear better than another. 
These contestations are difficult to fully appreciate without a greater understanding of the 
historical habitus of individuals in Crimea. Using fresh and now virtually unobtainable data, I 
provide an ethnographic exploration into the thoughts and feelings of a subset of the non-Crimean 
Tatar population, showing a durable disposition that informs interpretations of the past. This 
perspective on the past gains its emotional valence in part from the categorical thinking, the 
ontological resonance of imagining Crimean Tatars as a threat. Based on the interview data, it 
seems Crimea lacks the cognitive and affective foundation to formulate an inclusive and civil 
society. Here, the lack of both guilt and shame with respect to the 1944 deportation are significant. 
If we place the Crimean Tatar experience in the framework of critical genocide studies, we 
see the struggle over the past in Crimea as a technology of power that has an ongoing capacity 
to restructure relations among the living. I have exposed part of the process through which the 
aftermath of genocide has become attenuated. More ethnography can clarify if we are witnessing the 
aftermath of genocide or its prelude. The desecration of graves, the graffiti on historic monuments, 
hateful discussions on Facebook and other social media, searches of homes, mosques and schools, 
and the exile and imprisonment of Crimean Tatar leaders beg that question. 
The question of what will become of public memory in post-Ukrainian Crimea is an urgent 
one: will Crimea be obligated to exclusively valorize the Soviet past, or will it “unhide” the human 
and social costs associated with past victories? In the aftermath of genocide, the contents of 
Crimean Tatar memory and history continue to be eclipsed, and neostalinism thrives. Any attempt 
by the new authorities to see only one side of the historic coin will result in a flat and ultimately 
unsatisfying account of the past. 
Endnotes
1 Alexander Laban Hinton, “Critical Genocide Studies,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, 1 (April 2012): 4–15.
2 This figure is based on a survey that Crimean Tatars carried out in the first years of exile (Cemilev, personal 
interview, June 1995). According to NDVD estimates, 27 percent of the population perished in the first 
three years Nikolai Zemskov, 1995. “Spetsposelentsy iz Kryma: 1944-1956.” [Special Settlers from Crimea 
1944-1956] Krymskie Muzei 1/94 Simferopol, Tavria, 75.
3 Daniel Feierstein, Genocide as a Social Practice, trans. Douglas Andrew Town (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 2014), 12. Ebook.
4 It is important here to avoid homogenizing or oversimplifying complex identities and loyalties. I use 
Russian sympathizers here because what united my informants were that they were Russian-speaking, of 
Russian or mixed Russian and Ukrainian ancestry, and sympathized with Russia. 
5 Jan Plamper, The Stalin Cult: A Study in The Alchemy of Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 12.
6 Nanci Adler, “Reconciliation with—or Rehabilitation of—the Soviet Past?” Memory Studies 5, 3 (2012), 328.
7 Johan Galtung, “After Violence: Reconstruction, Reconciliation, and Resolution,” in Reconciliation, Justice, 
and Coexistence: Theory and Practice, ed. Abu-Nimer, Muhammed (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 
3-23; L. Kriesberg, “Changing Forms of Coexistence,” in Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and 
Practice, ed. Muhammed Abu-Nimer (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001); Barbara Tint, “History, 
Memory, and Intractable Conflict,” Conflict Resolution Quarterly 27, 3 (2010): 239-256. 
8 Adler, “Reconciliation,” 328.
9 Adler, “Reconciliation,” 336.
10 The treatment of the Ukrainian-speaking population of Crimea warrants a separate article of its own. Their 
relation to both the Crimean Tatars and the pro-Russia Russians is a complex outside the scope of an article 
focused on the genocide of the Crimean Tatars. 
11 Molly Andrews, “Shaping History: Narratives of Political Change” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 161.
Uehling
©2015     Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 1 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.1.1273
16
12 Janine Natalya Clark, “The ‘Crime of Crimes’: Genocide, Criminal Trials and Reconciliation, Journal 
of Genocide Research 14, 1 (2012): 55-77; Lyndsay McLean Hilker, “Everyday Ethnicities: Identity and 
Reconciliation Among Rwandan Youth,” Journal of Genocide Research 11, 1 (2009): 81-100; Lars Waldorf, 
“Revisiting Hotel Rwanda: Genocide Ideology, Reconciliation, and Rescuers,” Journal of Genocide Research 
11, 1 (2009): 101-125; Eugenia Zorbas, “What Does Reconciliation After Genocide Mean? Public Transcripts 
and Hidden Transcripts in Post-genocide Rwanda,” Journal of Genocide Research 11, 1 (2009): 127-147.
13 Foundation for Research and Support of Indigenous Peoples of Crimea, “Information Provided by the 
Government of Ukraine on the Implementation of the Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination” (27 August 2007) Doc CERD/C/UKR/CO/18/Add.1, p. 7.
14 Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France 1995-1996, eds., Mauro Bertani 
and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 1997), 66-76.
15 Greta Uehling, Beyond Memory: The Crimean Tatars’ Deportation and Return (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004); Greta Uehling “Squatting, Self-Immolation, and the Repatriation of Crimean Tatars,” Nationalities 
Papers 28 (2000): 317-342.
16 Interview, Crimean Tatar Mejlis, May 26, 2013.
17 Brian Glyn Williams, A Homeland Lost: Migration, the Diaspora Experience and the Forging of Crimean Tatar National 
Identity (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Wisconsin Madison 1999); Greta Uehling, Beyond Memory: The 
Deportation and Return of the Crimean Tatars (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Uehling, “Squatting, Self-
Immolation, and the Repatriation of Crimean Tatars,” Nationalities Papers 28 (2000): 317-342; Greta Uehling, 
“The Crimean Tatar National Movement: Social Memory and Collective Action,” in Globalizations and Social 
Movements, eds., John Guidry, Michael Kennedy, and Mayer N. Zald (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2000).
18 The accomplishments of two decades of rigorous effort toward cultural and political revival are still being 
assessed, but the re-establishment of the Crimean Tatar political body, the Mejlis, from prerevolutionary 
times, the reopening of mosques and medrese, the resuscitation of traditional decorative arts, and the re-
establishment of Crimean Tatar as a language of instruction in some schools stand out as achievements.
19 Having provided the first full exploration of the Crimean Tatars’ narrative accounts in my first ethnography, 
Uehling 2004. 
20 Uehling, “Beyond Memory,” 2004.
21 The mutual contestation that takes place when knowledges characterized by different normative 
frameworks are pushed up against each other and individuals are compelled to question each other’s 
omissions, exclusions, and hegemonies. Jose Medina, “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: 
Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism,” Foucault Studies 12 (2011): 9-35. 
22 Yuri Shevchuk, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Symposium, “Crimea: Whose Homeland?” Harvard 
University, May 19, 2014.  
23 Greta Uehling, “The Release of Haytarma and its Aftermath” http://www.iccrimea.org/reports/kaytarma-
review1.html.
24 Galenko cited in Gulnara Bekirova and Elvidin Chubarov, Толерантные Учебники – Толерантное 
Общество [Tolerant Textbooks – Tolerant Society] (Simferopol: Tezis, 2011), 19-20.  
25 Katherine Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 36.
26 Украинская Правда, The Crimean Tatars Dispersed Exhibition Dedicated to Stalin December 21, (2012) 
Available at http://ww.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2012/12/21/6980227.
27 Interview, 25 May, 2014.
28 Levada Tsentr. “Rossiane o roli Stalina v istorii nashei strany,” 21 December 2005.
29 Levada Tsentr. “Vydaiushchiesia liudi vsekh vremen i narodov,” 10 June 2008.
30 Polly Jones, Myth, Memory, Trauma (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 261.
31 Jones, Myth Memory, Trauma, 261.
32 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” The Pelican Freud Library. Translated, J. Strachery, 11 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 245-268. For the concept of geopolitical melancholia and post-colonial 
melancholia see Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New 
International. Translated, P. Kamuf (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Paul Gilroy, After Empire. Melancholia or 
Convivial Culture (London: Routledge, 2004). 
33 Jones, Myth Memory Trauma, 261. 
34 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of the Theory of Practice, trans., Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977), 82-83.
Genocide’s Aftermath in Crimea
©2015     Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 1 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.1.1273
17
35 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans., Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), 54. 
36 Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J.D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1992), 20.
37 Alexander Hinton, Why Did They Kill?: Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press), 27.
38 My contact at the Russian society drew from the database of members to fill the age and gender quotas I 
requested. This selection is likely to be biased by her judgments about who would be a willing informant, 
and also availability in May and June 2013.
39 Susan Corbesero, “History, Myth, and Memory: A Biography of a Stalin Portrait,” Russian History 38 (2011), 58-84.
40 May 9 is also known as Victory Day because it celebrates the capitulation of Nazi Germany to the Soviet 
Union. In the days of the Soviet Union, the holiday was marked throughout the various Soviet Socialist 
republics and typically a non-working holiday.
41 Interview, 3 June, 2013. 
42 Interview, 3 June, 2013.
43 Kathleen E. Smith, Remembering Stalin’s Victims: Popular Memory and the End of the USSR (Ithica: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), 8.
44 Interview, 1 June, 2013.
45 Rory Finnin, “Forgetting Nothing, Forgetting No One: Boris Chichibabin, Viktor Nekipelov, and the 
Deportation of the Crimean Tatars,” Modern Language Review 106, 4 (2011): 1124.
46 Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
47 Interview, 30 May, 2013.
48 Interview, 30 May, 2013.
49 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. “Report on the Human Rights 
Situation in Ukraine, 15 April, 2014.”
50 Interview, 26 May, 2013.
51 Theodor. W Adorno, “Schuld und Abwehr, Eine Qualitative Analyse zum ‘Gruppenexperiment,’” 
Soziologische Schriften II, Gesammelte Schriften 9. 2, ed. R. Tiedemann (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1955/1998), 
121-325; Max Horkeimer. “Vorwort zu Paul Passings ‘Vorgeschichte des Politischen Antisemitismus,’” in 
Gesammelte Schriften 8 (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1959/1985), 126-130.
52 Alexander Mischerlich and Margaret Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective 
Behavior (New York: Grove Press, 1975); Katharina Rothe, “Anti-Semitism in Germany Today and the 
Intergenerational Transmission of Guilt and Shame,” Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society 17, 1 (2012): 16-34. 
53 Rothe, “Antisemitism in Germany,” 10.
54 For example, a pervasive trope repeated in reference to Crimean Tatars by people who are referencing 
nothing more than hearsay, is that during the war, Crimean Tatars were seen with severed, still bleeding 
Russian heads tied to their belts. 
55 Uehling, http://www.iccrimea.org/reports/kaytarma-review1.html
56 Dominick LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). 
57 Donald Rayfield, “How the Crimean Tatars Have Survived,” The Guardian 21 June 2014.
58 Rayfield, “How the Crimean Tatars have Survived.”
59 Feierstein, Genocide as a Social Practice, 14.
60 Verdery, “The Political Lives of Dead Bodies,” 12. 
61 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/09/vladimir-putin-arrives-crimea-victory-day-ukraine
62 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for helping me to make this point more explicit. 
63 Tok шоу Гравитация ‘Запрет на митинг’ Available at: http://atr.ua/video/2014-05-16-22-41-51-4040637 
Last access 17 July 2014. 
64 Interview, May 16, 2014. http://atr.ua/video/2014-05-16-22-41-51-4040637.
65 Priscilla Haynor, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York: 
Routledge, 2010).
66 http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/07/crimea-enforced-disappearances; Uehling, “‘Crimeastan’ Society for 
Cultural Anthropology Hot Spots,” October 28, 2014 available at http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/617-
crimeastan.
